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Abstract
The purpose of this work is to evaluate the redistributive role of government social security
transfers on inequality in China. We attempt to answer two questions. First, does inequality of
after-transfer income narrow, compared to that of before-transfer income? Second, given the
scale and distribution of existing government social security transfers, will a small percentage
increase in the transfers narrow or widen the inequality of total income? By employing the
methodologies of the Musgrave-Thin (MT) index and decomposition of the Gini coefficient of
total income by its sources, we find a positive answer to the first question and a negative answer
to the second question. Government social security transfers have a positive role on inequality in
the sense that the Gini coefficient of after-transfer income is smaller than that of before-transfer
income. However, government social security transfers have a negative role on inequality, as
current inequality will go up if there is a universal increase in government social security
transfers for all recipients. Of all the components of government social security transfers, formal
sector pension benefits and medical expense reimbursements are disequalizing, whereas the
dibao and rural pension benefits are equalizing.
Keywords: China, inequality, social security, taxes, transfers
JEL Classification: H23, H55, O23, P35
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I.

Introduction

Public transfers that households receive through social security schemes are one of the most
significant systems to ensure and improve people’s livelihood and to promote social fairness and
justice. As a major component of government public expenditures in many countries, social
security expenditures play a crucial role in narrowing income inequality. A major reason for low
inequality in the developed countries, as revealed by international experience, lies in the
government redistribution policies rather than market factors. Kristjánsson (2011), in a study of
the Gini coefficients based on the three definitions of income in sixteen OECD member states,
such as Italy, Luxembourg, and the UK, finds that among the sixteen OECD member states in
2007, the market Gini coefficient was 0.483 whereas the Gini coefficient of disposable income
was 0.289. The market Gini coefficient was reduced by 0.193 due to the government
redistribution policies, and 80.83 percent of the reduction was due to public transfers, a much
higher share than those of the personal income tax and social security contributions of
individuals. Studies by Milanovic (1999) and Mahler and Jesuit (2006) on income distributions
in several OECD states from 1967 to 2000 also show that government transfers and personal
income taxation can lower the income inequality index, with the public transfers playing a key
role and contributing to as much as 80 percent of the reduction in income inequality.
The social security schemes in some developing countries also display a significant effect in
3

narrowing the degree of income inequality. Lustig (2011), in a study of the redistributive role of
public transfers in Latin America countries, found that public transfers in Brazil and Mexico also
had a strong effect on income redistribution, explaining 75.2 percent of the improvement.
Therefore, the experience of both the developed and the developing countries reveal that public
transfers, with social security expenditures as their income source, act as a primary government
mechanism to improve income redistribution. In addition, research has found that government
redistribution policies, rather than market factors, lead to the higher income inequality in China
than in the developed countries (Cai and Yue 2016). Thus, to achieve the goal of narrowing
income inequality and to realize social fairness and justice, we should focus on the redistributive
role of public transfers.
The degree of the redistribution effect of public transfers has much to do with the scale of
social security expenditures in government budgets, which are the source of funding for public
transfers. In general, most developed countries have a larger scale of social security expenditures
than developing countries, which raises the question of whether China’s scale of social security
expenditures is large or small when compared to that of other countries. The ratio of social
security expenditures to GDP is often used for such comparisons. For example, in 1995, the
average ratio of social security expenditures to GDP in eight countries, including the UK,
Sweden, Finland, Denmark, the United States, Japan, and so on, was 32.2 percent. 1 In addition,
the level of social security expenditures measured by this ratio is closely related to economic
development. Taking GDP per capita as an indicator of economic development, the higher a
1

Based on the OECD.
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country’s GDP per capita, the higher the ratio of its social security expenditures to GDP. This
indicates a positive relationship between social security expenditures and economic development.
Figure 10.1 displays the relationship between the ratio of social security expenditures to GDP per
capita in 56 countries and regions in 2012. GDP per capita is on a comparable basis in these
countries.
[Figure 10.1 about here]
We can see from the figure that there is an obvious positive relation between GDP per capita
and the ratio of social security expenditures to GDP, meaning that social security expenditures
will increase as GDP per capita increases. A fitted line from the regression is also depicted in the
figure and China is located below the fitted line, indicating that social security expenditures in
China are below the average, even considering its stage of economic development. The predicted
values of the ratio of social security expenditures to GDP based on Chinese per capita GDP
calculated from the regression was 10.5 percent, which was high compared to the 7.2 percent in
the actual value. This finding is supported by other studies. For example, according to the
Caizhengbu shehui baozhangsi ketizu (Ministry of Finance Social Security Task Group) (2007),
during the period from 2002 to 2006 China’s social-security level remained between 5.41 percent
and 5.60 percent, lower than not only the developed countries such as the United States,
Germany, or France, but also lower than some developing countries, such as Kazakhstan, Poland,
and Hungary, as well as Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay.
Low social security expenditures in China are one of obstacles to the social security
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programs ability to play a strong role in terms of affecting inequality. The focus of the chapter is
government social security transfers, not all transfers. Specifically, in our research we include
pensions, dibao, medical expense reimbursements, and farmer subsidies. Private transfers are not
part of our analysis. 2

Given the scale of the government social security transfers, and hence the

amount of the public transfers received by households, the degree of the redistributive role of
government social security transfers depends on how the transfers are distributed among the
households. If they are distributed so that poor people receive more transfers, then the transfers
will have a positive role on inequality. The more transfers received by the poor, the greater the
role that the transfers will play in terms inequality. However, if the distribution of such transfers
is concentrated on wealthier people, the transfers will have a negative role in terms of the income
distribution.
To examine the distribution of the public transfers, we must examine the micro data at the
household level. This is main purpose of this study. Namely, the objective of this study is to
evaluate the redistributive role of public transfers in China by using household-level data.
In measuring the distributive role of government social security transfers in China, we focus
on two questions. The answers to these two questions may produce different, opposite,
conclusions about the role of public transfers on inequality. The first question is whether
after-transfer income, compared to before-transfer income, narrows inequality. The second

Since the aim of this chapter is to evaluate the redistributive role of government transfers, we do not
include private transfers in our analysis. Among the different government social security transfers, we
focus on pensions, dibao, medical expense reimbursements, and farmer subsidies, since they constitute
the largest share of total public transfers.
6
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question is, given the scale and distribution of existing government social security transfers, will
marginal increases in each of different transfer programs narrow or widen inequality? We find a
positive answer to the first question but a negative answer to the second question. The two
answers have clearly different policy implications.

II. A Brief Introduction to the Social Security System in China

Households in China, like households in other countries, receive public transfers from
governments mainly through a variety of social security programs. This section provides a brief
introduction to the social security system in China to help readers have a better understanding of
the redistributive role of the public transfers to be discussed in next section.
Like other countries, while the social security system in China consists of a variety of
sub-schemes, the principal elements of the social security system include pension insurance,
health insurance, and social relief, which we will introduce below. Some other schemes specific
to the rural areas are also introduced.
In China pension insurance contains several complicated elements that are beyond the scope
of this study. 3 In the following, we will summarize the most significant feature of the Chinese
pension system and focus on those elements that are of relevant to an evaluation of the
redistributive role of the public transfers.
A major feature of the pension system in China is its fragmentation. The Chinese pension
3

For a full account of the pension system in China, see, for example, Dorfman et al. (2013).
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system is fragmented in terms of targeting population groups, financing, levels of benefits, and
so on. The principal pension schemes in China include pensions for civil servants and
public-sector units (PSUs), the urban employee social insurance pension system, the New Rural
Social Pension Scheme (NRSPS), and the Urban Residents Pension Scheme (URPS). After the
economic reforms, the first pension insurance was established for enterprise workers in the urban
areas in 1997.

Prior to this, elderly care services, as well as health care, housing, and many

other services for workers had been provided by their work units. The pension insurance was set
up with the intention of separating responsibility for elder-care services from the enterprises. The
targeted population of the scheme was limited only to only those who worked for enterprises in
the urban areas. Self-employed workers, irregular workers, and the non-working population in
urban areas were excluded from the pension scheme. At that time, civil servants working for
government agencies and workers in PSUs had not joined any of pension schemes but the Urban
Residents Pension Scheme (URPS). After the economic reforms they received retirement
benefits from government budgets. The NRSPS, which began implementation in late 2009,
aimed to achieve full geographic coverage no later than 2013. Participation for this pension
program is voluntary, and operational matters are left to local governments. The targeted
populations for the rural pension scheme were all residents living in the rural areas, and those
self-employed, irregular-working and non-working residents in the urban areas. The pilot
initially began in 10 percent of the nationwide counties, with an expectation that all counties in
China would be covered by 2013. The URPS, which began in mid-2011, shares almost the same
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design as the NRSPS. It aims to ensure a basic level of income support for the unemployed,
urban workers without employment contracts, and urban retirees without alternative sources of
retirement income. Moreover, the URPS covers only those with local urban hukou. Migrant
workers from rural or other urban areas are not eligible to participate in their city of residence
but only in the area where their hukou is registered.
It is clear from the above description that three pension schemes have been established in
China in an attempt to cover the entire population. In some sense, the enterprise worker pension
and the pension scheme for civil servants and PSU workers are pension schemes for employees
working in the formal sectors, whereas the urban-rural resident pension insurance was designed
for those working in the informal sector. There have been efforts by governments to integrate the
two pension schemes designed for formal-sector workers.
Benefit levels and their variations across different schemes influence the role of the pension
benefits on the inequality of total income. Although there is systematic information on the
replacement rates of benefit levels of the schemes, scattered evidence reveals huge differences in
the pension benefit level across the different pension schemes. The replacement rate for civil
servants and PSU workers’ benefits was 100 percent in about 2000 but it declined to about 63
percent in 2009, which was the highest pension benefit among all the pension schemes. The
replacement rate for enterprise employees was about 70 percent in 2001 but it declined to near 40
percent in 2009, well below that for civil servants and PSU workers. 4 Benefit levels in nominal
terms have increased steadily in the urban schemes, but wage replacement rates have been falling
4

World Bank and Development Research Center (2013, p. 339).
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in recent years. The level of rural pension benefits is the lowest, and it varies among provinces.
Medical insurance is another public social security program in China. The Urban Employee
Basic Medical Insurance (UEBMI) has been implemented by the government since 1998, and its
participants include employees in either the public or private sectors in the urban areas. Since
unemployed urban residents could not be included in UEBMI programs, the Urban Resident
Basic Medical Insurance (URBMI) was introduced by the government in 2007, which covers
non-workers with urban registrations. In rural areas, the New Cooperative Medical Scheme
(NCMS) was implemented in 2003 and covers all residents with rural registrations. To enforce
the health-care reforms and reduce the benefit disparities between the urban and rural areas, the
Chinese government intended to integrate the URBMI and the NCMS in 2016, which is called
the Urban and Rural Resident Basic Medical Insurance (URRBMI) system.
Unlike pension benefits and relief, medical insurance is not a fixed amount of transfers from
the government to those eligible, but reimburses medical expenses actually incurred by
households. The amounts of the medical-expense reimbursements depend on hospital levels,
types of beneficiaries, categories of medicines, and medical health care, but not all the medical
expenses can be reimbursed. In addition, participants in medical insurance programs usually
must first pay the medical expenses, after which they can receive the reimbursement. It is likely
that wealthier people receive most of the medical expense reimbursements, whereas the poor
receive fewer reimbursements, as they less likely to be able to finance their part of moderately
large medical expenses and hence they may not be eligible to receive the transfers. This occurs in

10

our sample, as will be seen in the analysis below.
The minimum living standard guarantee program, called dibao in Chinese, for urban
residents was experimented with in 1993 in Shanghai and rolled out nationwide in 1997. The
rural dibao program was experimented with in 2001 and expanded nationwide in 2007. The
dibao programs are designed to raise the income for poor households up to an income threshold.
The dibao programs are managed by local governments with some of the funds coming from the
central government. There are many problems, such as targeting inefficiencies and income
thresholds determined by local governments based on their fiscal capacity and thus low dibao
payments in impoverished areas. 5 The distribution of dibao transfers generally focuses on the
poor in the entire income distribution and hence they can help reduce poverty and inequality.
This will be verified below.

III. Data and Methods
A. Data
The household data used in this chapter comes from the household survey of 2013 conducted by
China Household Income Project (CHIP). The survey sample contains 62,603 individuals in
18,128 households, including 39,421 people in 10,551 rural households, 20,339 people in 6,866
urban households, as well as 2,843 people in 711 rural migrant households whose hukous are
registered in the rural areas but who work and live in urban areas. The sample includes the

See Chen, Ravallion, and Wang. (2006), Gao, Garfinkel, and Zhai (2009) and Golan, Sicular and
Umpathi (2014).
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fifteen provinces of Beijing, Liaoning, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Shandong, Shanxi, Anhui, Henan,
Hubei, Hunan, Chongqing, Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu, and Xinjiang. In the following calculation,
the sample is weighted by the population of three regions, that is, the eastern area, the central
area, and the western area, with each region further divided into three population groups: rural,
urban, and migrants.
Our definition of disposable income is basically consistent with that of the entire research
project, but it excludes in-kind housing subsidies. We divide the transfer income into public
transfers from the government and private transfers from individuals. The former includes
formal-sector pensions, urban resident pensions, rural resident pensions, dibao, medical expense
reimbursements, farmer subsidies, and other public transfers that include the social security
transfers, which are the focus of this chapter.

B. Methods
This study employs two indexes to evaluate the redistributive effects of public transfers: the
Musgrave and Thin (MT) index and a decomposition of the Gini coefficient by income sources.
Although these two indexes have been commonly used in the literature for this purpose, most
works only use one of them, without noting the differences between them. The two indexes
answer different questions regarding an evaluation of the redistributive role of public policy and
have different policy implications. Our chapter will further investigate this issue.
The MT index is a tool that was first used by Musgrave and Thin (1948) to evaluate the
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redistributive effects of taxes. The index is defined as the difference between the Gini
coefficients of before-tax and after-tax income, which is expressed by the following formula:
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 𝐺𝐺𝑋𝑋 − 𝐺𝐺𝑌𝑌

(1)

𝐺𝐺𝑋𝑋 and 𝐺𝐺𝑌𝑌 respectively represent the Gini coefficient of before- and after-tax income. If the

taxes improve income inequality, 𝐺𝐺𝑌𝑌 will be less than 𝐺𝐺𝑋𝑋 , leading to a positive value of the MT

index. In contrast, the MT index will be negative if the taxes widen income inequality.

The redistributive role of taxes evaluated by the MT index is closely related to the tax
progressivity. Kakwani (1984) establishes a link between the MT index and the tax progressivity
index by decomposing the MT index as follows:
t

MT = (CY − GY ) + 1−t P

(2)

where 𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌 is the concentration ratio of after-tax income, with before-tax income as sorting

variable. 𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌 − 𝐺𝐺𝑌𝑌 measures the horizontal equity of taxation and takes a value of 0 if taxation
does not alter the income rankings of all individuals, that is, the income rankings are the same

according to both the pre-tax and the after-tax income. This term will be negative if taxation
alters the income ranking of any individual, indicating that the principle of horizontal equity is
violated. Normally, 𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌 and 𝐺𝐺𝑌𝑌 are not equal but very close, hence 𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌 − 𝐺𝐺𝑌𝑌 has little influence

on the MT index. P stands for the progressive index of the tax defined as follows:
P = 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇 − 𝐺𝐺𝑥𝑥 ,

(3)

where 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇 is the concentration ratio of the tax and 𝐺𝐺𝑥𝑥 represents the Gini coefficient of the

pre-tax income. P not only determines the direction of the MT index but also, combined with
13

the average tax rate, denoted by t, determines the extent to which the tax affects the MT index.

Assuming 𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌 − 𝐺𝐺𝑌𝑌 = 0, if P > 0, meaning that the tax is progressive, then MT > 0 and the
tax will reduce inequality and, conversely, if P < 0, meaning that the tax is regressive, then
MT < 0 and the tax will exacerbate inequality. A proportional tax, that is, P = 0, has no effect

on inequality. It is worth noting that the progressivity of the tax, P, and the average tax rate, t,

can be determined separately, in the sense that one can change t while keeping P unchanged

and vice versa.

The MT index can be used to evaluate the role of public transfers on inequality (Wang et al.

2016; Chen, Wen, and Ren 2016), as long as the transfers can be treated as negative taxes. In the

case of public transfers, P < 0 means that the transfer scheme is progressive. It combines with
the negative transfers ratio, that is, t < 0, to make the Gini of the after-transfer income smaller
than that of the before-transfer income.

After introducing the MT index, we move to another methodology to evaluate the
redistributive role of public transfers. A decomposition of the Gini coefficient by income sources
is another way of looking at the effects of public transfers on income distribution. If the total
income of each individual can be divided into the income sources, that is, 𝑦𝑦 = ∑𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘=1 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘 , then the

Gini coefficient of the total income can be decomposed as the weighted sum of the concentration
ratios of the income sources, with the weights being the shares of the income sources in the total
income. The decomposition can be written as the following:
𝐺𝐺 = ∑𝐾𝐾
𝑘𝑘=1 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘 .
14

(4)

where 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 represents the concentration ratio of income source of k, and 𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘 represents the share
of the corresponding income source in the total income. A decomposition of the Gini coefficient

is, in most cases, used to investigate the determinants of inequality in the total income, that is,
how and to what extent each income source contributes to the inequality of the total income. The
decomposition also provides information to judge whether a certain income source is an
equalizing or a disequalizing factor in terms of the inequality of the total income.
What determines whether a certain income source is equalizing or disequalizing in terms of
the inequality of the total income? The answer is found by comparing the size of the
concentration ratio of the income source to the Gini of total income. If the concentration ratio of
income source k is smaller than the Gini of total income, that is, 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 < 𝐺𝐺 , then a small

percentage increase in the income source for the entire sample will lead to a decline (depending
on the size of 𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘 ) in the inequality of the total income, and vice versa. When 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 equals 𝐺𝐺, a
small increase in this income source will not change the Gini of the total income.

Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) develop a formula that accurately measures the direction
(whether equalizing or disequalizing) and also the degree to which income sources influence the
inequality of total income.

The formula is the following: 6

This formula differs slightly from that of Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985). The original formula is as
follows:

6

∂G/∂e
G

= Sk

Rk Gk −G
G

,

where 𝐺𝐺𝑘𝑘 denotes the Gini coefficient of income source of k, and 𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑘 is a term reflecting the correlation
between the total income and its source k.
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𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕/𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝐺𝐺

= 𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘

𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 −𝐺𝐺
𝐺𝐺

(5)

where 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 indicates a small percentage change in income source k. It is clear from this formula

that the scale of the concentration ratio of income source k, 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 , is relative to the Gini of the

total income, 𝐺𝐺, determines the direction of the effect of the income source in question on the

inequality of the total income. That is, if 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 > 𝐺𝐺, then a small percentage change in income

source k will lead to a rise in the Gini of the total income, and vice versa. If 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 = 𝐺𝐺, any

change in the income source has no impact on the distribution of the total income. It is also clear

from the formula that the extent to which a certain income source affects the inequality of the
total income depends on two factors: its share in the total income and its concentration ratio. All
else being equal, the larger the share and the bigger the concentration ratio, then the income
source will have a more significant effect on the inequality of the total income.
It is clear from the above explanations that both methods provide information needed for an
evaluation of the redistributive role of public taxes and transfers. The two methods, however, are
not the same. First, the Gini decomposition differs from the MT index approach in that it tells us
the equalizing/disequalizing impact on the margin of all sources of income, not only that of
transfers. Second, and more importantly, the difference between the two methods is anchored by
reference to the comparison or starting point. Using transfer income as an example, the MT index
uses inequality of before-transfer income as a reference, and it compares the inequality of the
after-transfer income with this reference. It attempts to answer the following question: is the
inequality after the transfers narrowed, as compared to the inequality before the transfers? If the
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inequality of income inclusive of the transfers is lower than that of income exclusive of the
transfers, then the transfers play an equalizing role on inequality. In contrast, the Gini
decomposition takes the inequality of after-transfer income as the reference or starting point, and
attempts to answer the following question: what would the inequality be if there was a small
percentage change in a certain income source for all individuals? If the inequality declines in
response to a small increase in the income source, then the income source plays an equalizing
role on the inequality of the total income. Due to the difference in the reference or starting point,
the two methods can reach different, mostly opposite, conclusions about the redistributive role,
even for the same policy measures. Again, using public transfers as an example, it is likely that
the MT index shows that the inequality of income inclusive of the transfer is smaller than that of
income before the transfer, and, at the same time, results from the decomposition indicate that a
slight increase in the transfers for all individuals will lead to a rise in current inequality, that is, in
the inequality of income inclusive of the transfers. This occurs when the transfers are distributed
toward the higher income group in the income distribution based on after-transfer income, but
toward the lower income group in the income distribution based on before-transfer income. In
other words, if the transfers are distributed too much in favor of the group that is relatively poor
according to before-transfer income, then the two methods produce opposite conclusions about
the redistributive role of the transfers.
It is important to emphasize that the questions that both methods ask and attempt to answer
are equally important but have different policy implications. The MT index attempts the answer
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the following question: do public transfers reduce inequality, whereas the question that
decomposition approach attempts to answer is the following: given current scale and distribution
of the public transfers, how would inequality be affected if a government plans to raise the
transfers, say by 1 percent. In some sense, the answer to the question asked by the MT index is
obvious, because public transfers are generally designed as an income source for poor people (in
terms of income exclusive of the transfers) and, therefore, the transfers should be equalizing. In
this case, the usefulness of calculating the MT index is to gauge accurately the extent to which
the transfers reduce inequality. In contrast, the answer to the question asked by the Gini
decomposition approach is less obvious than that of the MT index approach, at least in the
Chinese context. Formal-sector pension benefits have grown by annual rate of over 10 percent
for more than the past ten years, and there is a need to continue this trend.

A decomposition of

the Gini can provide information about whether further increases in formal-sector pension
benefits will widen or narrow inequality, so they provide a redistributive evaluation of the need
to continue growth. The MT index calculation, however, does not serve this purpose. This will be
clear in the following section.

IV. Empirical results

This section looks at the redistributive role of public transfers as a whole and by their main
components, using the two methods described in last section. The focus of this chapter is the
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potential differences in the redistributive role of transfers as evaluated by the two approaches,
and their different policy implications.
Before presenting the results of calculating the indexes in the two approaches, we report the
per capita values of the main types of public transfers (see Table 10.1). As introduced in Section
2 above, there are several different transfers coming from the different social security schemes.
In Table 10.1, we list the main transfers separately but we combine the remainder together into
one transfer. The independently listed transfers include formal-sector pensions, urban resident
pensions, rural resident pensions, dibao, medical expense reimbursements, and farmer subsidies.
We choose these transfers to list separately based on their regularity, their large share in the total
transfers from the government, and their potential importance in the future of the social security
program in China, such as the dibao. The transfers combined into “other transfers” include other
pensions, 7 social relief (other than dibao), and so on. One weakness of data related to
information on pensions is that the pension benefits received by civil servants and PSU workers
and those received by retired enterprises workers are not separately available but are combined in
the data on formal-sector pensions. As discussed in Section 2 above, government and PSU
retirees receive much higher pension benefits than retirees from urban enterprises, which means
that the pensions of civil servants and PSU workers may have a different effect on inequality
than the pensions of urban enterprise workers. 8

Other pensions include nursing fees for retired people with occupational injuries, pensions received by
unguaranteed urban elderly, subsidies for heating expenses, books, newspapers, other aids for difficulties,
and so forth.
8
The pension system for enterprise workers covers all types of urban enterprises, including both
state-owned and private enterprises.
19
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[Table 10.1 about here]
As can be seen from Table 10.1, per capita public transfer income per capita for the nation
as a whole was 2,898 yuan, and the transfer amounts differed among rural, urban, and migrant
households. The public transfers that urban households received were 6,126 yuan in per capita
terms, whereas they were only 739 yuan for rural households and 389 yuan for migrants. The
transfers that urban households received were 8.3 times those of rural households, and 15.8 times
those of migrant households. The per capita income of urban households without public transfers
is 2.3 times that of rural households. This ratio rises to 2.7 after the two types of households
receive the public transfers. Urban-rural income gaps, sometimes called the urban-rural income
divide, is one of the most important sources of inequality in China. The public transfers in fact
worsen the urban-rural divide.
Pension benefits are dominant among the public transfers, as they account for nearly 90
percent of the total public transfers for the nation as a whole (the formal- sector pensions, urban
resident pensions, and rural resident pensions combined). The proportions differ between the
rural and the urban households. In the urban areas the formal-sector pensions and the urban
resident pensions, the two pension schemes designed for urban households, account for 94.1
percent of the public transfers. Among the rural households, three pension programs together
account for 54.3 percent of the total transfer income received from the governments. Farmer
subsidies and other transfers also prove to be a large share of the public transfers for rural
households.

20

In the following, we discuss the redistributive role of public transfers. The role of transfers
on inequality depends on their distribution among the different income groups. That is, if the
low-income group receives more transfers than the high-income group, then the transfers will
help reduce the inequality. Accurate measurements of the redistributive role depend on the
calculation of the inequality indexes and their decomposition, as introduced in last section.
However, here we use an income quantile technique to present a very intuitive look at the effects
of public transfers on inequality. As discussed in the last section, using income as a reference is
important. When examining how the transfers are distributed among the income groups, income
here as a reference can be income either inclusive or exclusive of the transfers. When income
without the transfers is used to make the income quantile, the distribution of the transfers among
the different quantiles will provide information similar to that from the MT index, whereas when
the income with the transfers is used to create the income quantile, an evaluation from the
distribution of the transfers among the quantiles will be similar to the decomposition of the Gini
by income sources. In the following we use disposable income per capita with and without public
transfers as a reference to create the income quantiles and to examine how the transfers are
distributed among the different deciles.
[Table 10.2 about here]
Table 10.2 shows the distribution of the main public social-security transfers among deciles,
sorted by the disposable income per capita exclusive of the public transfers. As can be seen from
the table, the share of total public transfers received by each decile rises as we move up the

21

income distribution, even though the rise occurs very clearly only for the first three lowest
deciles and it changes very little for the remainder of the deciles. This means that, on average,
low-income people receive more public transfers than high-income people, and hence public
transfers are progressive. The per capita transfers, for instance, of the lowest decile is above two
times that of those of the highest decile. The progressivity of total public transfers indicates the
positive role of the transfers on income inequality. As to the components of the public transfers
in the table, the shares of dibao decline consistently and substantially when moving up the
income distribution. Most of the components of the public social-security transfers show a
similar trend as the dibao. An exception occurs with respect to medical expense reimbursements,
with shares varying across the deciles and not revealing any clear trend.
[Table 10.3 about here]
Table 10.3 displays the distribution of public transfers among the deciles sorted by the
disposable income per capita including the social-security transfers. Compared with Table 10.2,
the table indicates that public transfers are no longer progressive; rather, they have become
regressive. The share of each decile in the total public transfers rises consistently as we move up
the distribution. The lowest decile, for example, receives only 1.3 percent of the total transfers,
against 35.2 percent for the highest decile. This means that the total public transfers per capita of
the highest decile is 27.3 times that of the lowest decile. The ratio is bigger than that for the total
income, which is 22.1 times.
Dibao and farmer subsidies remain progressive, compared to their distribution among the
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deciles created according to income exclusive of the transfers. This means that after taking the
transfers into account, the two transfers are distributed such that low-income people receive more
than high-income people. In contrast, the remainder of the sub-transfers have become regressive,
as the shares of these transfers have increased when moving up the income ladder. This situation
arises because the transfers move some people from a lower pre-transfer income decile to a
higher post-transfer income decile, which causes an “over adjustment”. This is especially the
case for pensions as some urban residents might have zero income or very low income before
receiving pensions, but with the pensions they are in the high-income deciles. The ratio of the
share of the highest decile to that of the lowest decile is 148.2 for formal-sector pension, 56.9 for
urban resident pensions, and 15.9 for medical expense reimbursements.

Surprisingly, 44.4

percent of the total medical expense reimbursements go to the highest decile.
Although the above discussion based on income quantiles can predict the redistributive role
of transfers as a whole and by components, an accurate quantitative evaluation should rely on a
calculation of the indexes discussed in the previous section.
[Table 10.4 about here]
Table 10.4 presents the results of calculating the MT indexes for China as a whole and the
three population groups, that is, rural residents, urban residents, and migrants. It is clear from the
table that the MT indexes are positive both for the country as a whole and for each of the three
population groups, thus indicating the equalizing role of public transfers. For the entire country,
the Gini coefficients of income without and with transfers are 0.4604 and 0.4364 respectively
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and their difference, namely the MT index, is 0.0239, meaning the transfers reduce the Gini by
2.39 percent (=(0.4604-0.4364)*100). The transfers have the greatest impact on inequality in the
urban areas, with the MT index at 0.0758, and second greatest impact for the rural areas, with the
corresponding MT index at 0.0136. The transfers have the least and a minor impact for migrant
households, with the Gini coefficient remaining almost unchanged from income without transfers
to income with the transfers. The pre-transfer and post-transfer income gaps between urban and
rural residents are 13,794 yuan and 19,182 yuan, respectively, which means that the
social-security transfers increase the urban-rural income difference by 39.1 percent
(=(19182-13794)/13794). The urban-rural income ratio increases if it is measured including
versus excluding the social-security transfers, 9 indicating that after the adjustment of
government transfers, the urban-rural income gap is widening. Therefore, it seems that
government social-security transfers play a reverse redistributive role between urban and rural
residents, which is consistent with the findings in Wang et al. (2016). 10
[Table 10.5 about here]
It is evident that the transfers reduce inequality according to the MT index analysis. What
will happen, however, if the decomposition of the Gini coefficient is used? Table 10.5 presents
the results of conducting a decomposition of the Gini for total income by its components. The

9 The urban-rural income ratio is 2.3 (24339/10545) if measured excluding the social- security transfers.
This ratio becomes 2.7 (30465/11283) if measured including the transfers.
10 The similarity between our research and Wang et al. (2016) is that we both valuate the redistributive
effects of social-security transfers. The differences exist in the range of the research object. Wang et al.
(2016)’s micro-analysis focuses on social insurance, mainly urban resident pensions, rural resident
pensions, medical insurance, and so forth. Beyond the main types of social insurance, we also examine
other types of social-security transfers, such as formal-sector pensions, dibao, farmer subsidies, and so on.
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marginal effects in the table provide the most important information in terms of the direction and
extent to which the public transfers have an impact on inequality. As described in the last section,
if the marginal effect of an income source has a negative value, then it is equalizing on the
inequality of the total income, in the sense that a small percentage increase in the source for the
full sample will lead to a decrease in the Gini of the total income, and hence will reduce the
inequality of the total income.
It is clear from the table that the marginal effect of total public transfers is positive,
indicating that total public transfers, that is, all public transfers combined, are disequalizing for
total disposable income. In other words, if, for some reason, there is a small percentage increase
in the total transfers for every individual, the inequality measured by the Gini coefficient will
widen rather than narrow. The total transfers consist of different sub-transfers and, therefore, the
negative role of the total transfers on inequality comes from the results of the varying roles of the
sub-transfers offsetting each other. This indicates a need to look at the effects of each sub-transfer,
to determine which ones are equalizing and which ones are disequalizing for the inequality of the
total income.
As can be seen from the table, the sub-transfers with equalizing effects include the rural
pensions, dibao, farmer subsidies, and other transfers. All these transfers are closely related to
rural households, which are the low-income group in China. Among the sub-transfers with
disequalizing effects on the inequality of the total income are the formal-sector pensions, the
urban resident pensions, and the medical expense reimbursements, of which the formal-sector
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pensions are the most regressive element, not only among the public transfers but also among all
sources of the total income. 11 This point can be verified by a comparison of the concentration
ratios between the formal-sector pension benefits and other income sources. It is clear from Table
10.5 that the concentration ratio of formal pension benefits is 0.5992, the highest concentration
ratio among all sources of disposable income. It is not only well above the Gini of the total
disposable income but also exceeds that of property income, which normally is the most
unevenly distributed source in the total income. The formal-sector pensions take the place of
property income and become the most disequalizing element among all the income sources in
contemporary China.
Looking at the income sources other than the public transfers in the table, the two income
sources with an equalizing role are business income and private transfer income. The former
mainly consists of income from agricultural activities received by rural households, which are
the low-income group in China. The latter is dominant due to remittances to their rural homes
sent from migrants working in the urban areas.

V. Conclusions

The literature shows that redistributive policies such as public transfers and personal income
taxes play a key role in reducing inequality created by market forces, and the role played by
11

Yang et al. (2017) reports that in urban areas, pensions consistently helped to narrow the economic
distance over the years. They analyze the situation in the urban areas, whereas our estimates show the
redistributive effects of pensions in the entire country.
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public transfers is much larger than that played by personal income taxes. This study attempts to
evaluate the role that public transfers play for inequality in China by employing the CHIP 2013
household survey data.
Most of the existing works in this field so far have employed the MT index for this purpose,
which compares the Gini coefficient of before-transfer income with the Gini of after-transfer
income, and with almost no exception finds that the public transfers play a role in reducing
inequality.
This study, however, considers different issues to evaluate the redistributive role of public
transfers. We acknowledge the importance of an evaluation by the MT index, but argue that the
questions that need to be answered to evaluate the redistributive roles of government policies are
not only whether or not the inequality of after-transfer income is lower than the inequality after
the households received the transfers from the government, but also whether the inequality
increases or decreases if there is a universal growth in the public transfers, both the total and its
components, given the distribution of the existing transfers. The latter question is more important
in some cases. For instance, there is a strong need for regular growth in the formal-sector pension
benefits in China. One question we need to answer in response to this need is whether inequality
will increase or decrease if the government decides to make, say, a 5 percent increase in the
formal-sector pension benefits for all targeted beneficiaries of the scheme?
The goal of this work is to answer two questions in relation to an evaluation of the
redistributive role of public transfer on inequality in China. The first question is: does inequality
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of before-transfer income narrow, compared to that of after-transfer income? The second
question is: will a small percentage increase in transfers narrow or widen inequality in China,
given the scale and distribution of the existing public transfers? To answer to these questions,
two methods are chosen, the MT index for the former question and the decomposition of the Gini
coefficient of the total income by its sources for the latter question.

By calculating the MT

index, we find that public transfers have a positive role on the income distribution, both for
China as a whole and for each of the three population groups: rural residents, urban residents,
and migrants. This is in line with what most existing works have found both in China and in
other countries regarding the role of public transfers.
In answering the second question, however, we reach a different conclusion about the
redistributive role of public transfers. The total public transfers have a disequalizing role for the
inequality of income inclusive of the transfers, in the sense that if there is a universal (percentage)
increase in the total public transfers for all recipients, inequality will go up. The total public
transfers are comprised of different transfer schemes and the negative role of the total transfers,
evaluated by the decomposition of the Gini by income sources, is the result of the redistributive
effects of different transfers offsetting each other. We also examine the role of each of the
components of the total public transfers and find mixed results for the different components of
the public transfers. Dibao, the rural pension benefits, farmer subsidies, and other transfers play
an equalizing role on total disposable income, indicating that increases in these transfer schemes
will lead to a narrowing of the inequality of the total income. In contrast, the formal-sector
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pension benefits, the urban resident pension benefits, and the medical expense reimbursements
are disequalizing elements for total income. An increase in these transfers will lead to a widening
of the overall inequality in China. Surprisingly, among all the sources of total income, the
formal-sector pension benefits are the most disequalizing component, even more so than
property income.
The implications from the results of the decomposition are clear. More government spending
should go to dibao, the rural pension benefits schemes, and subsidies to the farmers in order to
further reduce the income disparities in China. Increases in the formal-sector pension benefits
will exacerbate income inequality. Even through there is a strong demand for regular growth in
the formal-sector pension scheme from vested interest groups, this cannot be justified in terms of
equality and equity. In addition, the current medical insurance schemes need to be reformed such
that a greater part of the medical expenses for the poor are financed by medical insurance that is
more accessible to the poor.
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Table 10.1. Per capita amounts of public transfers
Nation

Rural

Urban

Migrants

(Absolute values, unit: Yuan)
Formal sector pension
2,369
249
5,406
317
Urban resident pensions
168
46
357
10
Rural resident pensions
61
106
27
8
Dibao
32
31
42
2
Medical expense reimbursement
110
82
173
17
Farmer subsidies
58
118
6
8
Other transfers
100
107
115
27
Total
2,898
739
6,126
389
(Shares, unit: %)
Formal sector pensions
81.7
33.7
88.2
81.5
Urban resident pensions
5.8
6.2
5.8
2.6
Rural resident pensions
2.1
14.3
0.4
2.1
Dibao
1.1
4.2
0.7
0.5
Medical expense reimbursement
3.8
11.1
2.8
4.4
Farmer subsidies
2.0
16.0
0.1
2.1
Other public transfers
3.5
14.5
1.9
6.9
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Notes: Other public transfers include other old-age pensions, social assistance and subsidies,
excluding dibao, living allowances, and the cash value of in-kind goods and services received
from the government or organizations.
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Table 10.2. Distribution of the main public transfers among deciles sorted by disposable
income exclusive of the public transfers
Formal
Urban
Rural
Medical
Farmer
Other
Decile
sector
resident resident
Dibao
expense
subsidies Transfers
pension pension pension
reimbursement
1
1.0
18.4
19.5
9.7
13.6
28.9
11.5
15.4
14.8
2
2.6
11.1
10.8
10.8
11.9
19.0
10.0
17.8
13.0
3
3.8
9.4
8.6
12.4
12.6
11.3
15.6
16.1
10.4
4
5.0
9.8
9.6
12.0
8.8
12.1
9.0
13.6
8.8
5
6.4
9.8
9.4
12.1
15.9
9.9
8.7
12.6
10.5
6
8.1
7.9
7.6
11.3
10.2
6.9
5.6
9.4
10.6
7
10.2
8.8
8.7
9.8
7.6
5.5
11.2
6.5
8.1
8
13.0
7.6
7.9
5.0
8.8
4.8
6.2
4.4
8.6
9
17.6
8.2
8.2
10.9
6.3
1.4
11.5
2.2
7.4
10
32.4
9.1
9.7
6.1
4.5
0.1
10.8
2.1
7.9
Sum
100.1
100.1
100
100.1
100.2
99.9
100.1
100.1
100.1
Notes: People are sorted into the ten decile groups according to disposable income per capita, excluding
social security transfers. The sum of the income proportions in each column does not exactly equal 100
percent because of rounding.
Disposable
income

Total
transfers
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Table 10.3. Distribution of the main public transfers among deciles sorted by disposable
income inclusive of public transfers
Decile

Disposable
income

Total
transfers

Formal
sector
pension

Urban
resident
pension

Rural
resident
pension

Dibao

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Sum

1.4
2.9
4.0
5.3
6.7
8.4
10.4
13.1
17.2
30.7
100.1

1.3
1.7
2.2
2.9
4.9
6.7
10.1
14.8
20.3
35.2
100.1

0.3
0.5
1.1
2.0
4.2
6.3
10.0
15.5
21.7
38.5
100.1

0.4
1.4
1.8
2.6
5.8
8.2
12.9
18.7
24.4
23.9
100.1

8.6
10.3
11.0
10.2
10.5
11.6
11.4
11.9
7.8
6.7
100

20.2
18.9
12.0
14.1
10.9
7.6
8.6
4.6
2.4
0.6
99.9

Medical
Farmer
Other
expense
subsidies Transfers
reimbursement
2.8
4.1
4.5
5.2
6.5
5.6
7.1
6.9
13.0
44.4
100.1

16.8
16.2
16.9
14.3
12.8
9.5
5.2
4.8
1.6
1.9
100

6.2
8.5
9.9
9.2
8.0
10.2
12.2
12.3
10.8
12.8
100.1

Notes: People are sorted into the ten decile groups according to disposable income per capita including
social security transfers. The sum of the income proportions in each column does not exactly equal 100
percent because of rounding.
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Table 10.4. Gini coefficients of disposable income with and without public transfers
Gini of income per capita
Per capita income (Yuan)
Exclusive Inclusive of
Exclusive of
Inclusive of the
Difference
of transfers
transfers
transfers
transfers
(a)
(b)
(c)(=(a)-(b))
(d)
(e)
Nation
0.4604
0.4364
0.0239
17,640
20,537
Rural
0.4099
0.3963
0.0136
10,545
11,283
Urban
0.4274
0.3516
0.0758
24,339
30,465
Migrants
0.3545
0.3508
0.0037
21,435
21,824
Notes: Social protection fees and personal income tax have been deducted from disposable income.
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Table 10.5. Decomposition of the Gini of disposable income by its sources
Sources of total income

Proportion
in total
income
0.5565
0.1524
0.0354
0.1270
0.1411
0.1154
0.0082
0.0029
0.0016
0.0054
0.0028
0.0048
0.0325
-0.0449
1.0000

Concentration
ratio or Gini*

Contributed
share of Gini of
total income**
0.6139
0.0915
0.0453
0.1340
0.1709
0.1584
0.0092
-0.0002
-0.0012
0.0057
-0.0021
0.0011
-0.0099
-0.0457
1.0000

Wage income
0.4816
Business income
0.2620
Property income
0.5585
Imputed rents
0.4607
Public transfers
0.5288
Formal sector pension
0.5992
Urban resident pensions
0.4891
Rural resident pensions
-0.0275
Dibao
-0.3497
Medical expense reimbursement
0.4666
Farmer subsidies
-0.3281
Other transfers
0.1007
Private transfers
-0.1327
Tax and social security fees
0.4449
Disposable income
0.4364
Notes:
*Except for the Gini coefficient of the disposable income, all other figures in this
concentration ratios.
**Equal to column one times column two.
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Marginal
effects
0.0575
-0.0609
0.0099
0.0070
0.0298
0.0430
0.0010
-0.0031
-0.0028
0.0004
-0.0049
-0.0037
-0.0424
-0.0009
column are the
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Figure 10.1. The relationship between GDP per capita and the ratio of social security
expenditures to GDP (2012)
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Fitted values
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